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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-
2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Annotated (1968). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Is jury instruction No. 16, which states that "no presumption 
of negligence arises from the fact of an adverse event occurring 
during a defendants treatment." improper and reversible error in a 
res ipsa loquitur case? 
Is Jury Instruction No. 19, which prohibits the jury from 
relying upon their own experience and knowledge in determining the 
standard of care, the breach thereof, and proximate cause, improper 
and reversible error in a res ipsa loquitur case based upon the 
"common Knowledge" exception to the rule requiring expert testimony? 
Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury is a 
question of Law. Therefore, this Court should review the trial 
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court's instructions for correctness only, giving them no particular 
deference. (Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corporation, 774 P. 2d, 
1 [Ut. 1989]) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following rule of civil procedure may be controlling and 
determinative of the issues presented in this appeal. 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (amended 1987) 
Provides as follows: 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time 
as the court reasonably directs, any party may file 
written requests that the court instruct the jury on the 
law as set forth in said requests. The court shall inform 
counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to 
instructing the jury; and it shall furnish counsel with a 
copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties 
stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or 
otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions are 
to be given in writing, all objections thereto must be 
made before the instructions are given to the jury; 
otherwise, objections may be made to the instructions 
after they are given to the jury, but before the jury 
retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as 
error the giving or the failure to give an instruction 
unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of 
an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter 
to which he objects and the grounds for his objection. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appellate 
court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, 
may review the giving of or failure to give an 
instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make 
objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of 
the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made 
after the court has instructed the jury. The court shall 
not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors 
that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of 
fact. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant Lynn Nielsen filed this action against 
Pioneer Valley Hospital and Dr. D. M. Dixon, an anesthesiologist, 
for damages she suffered when she entered the Defendant hospital for 
a Knee operation and, after surgery, regained consciousness in the 
recovery room with several teeth knocked out and her bridgework 
damaged. 
She sued both Defendants on the theory of ordinary negligence 
as well as the theory of res ipsa loquitur. Prior to trial, the 
Defendants moved for summary judgment on all causes of action on the 
grounds that Plaintiff did not intend to present expert testimony as 
to the issues of standard of care and causation. The trial judge 
granted the motion. 
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her res ipsa loquitur claim 
to this Court, arguing that the "common knowledge" exception to the 
rule requiring expert testimony applied. She then moved for summary 
disposition. This Court summarily reversed the trial court's ruling 
as it pertained to the res ipsa loquitur claim, holding that the 
"common knowledge" exception did apply and that expert testimony was 
not necessary. 
Plaintiff thereafter proceeded at trial on the res ipsa 
loquitur theory and did not present expert evidence to support a 
theory of ordinary negligence. Defendants offered jury instructions 
numbered 16 and 19 which pertained to an ordinary negligence theory 
and which required the jury to rely only upon expert testimony, 
rather than their own knowledge and experience in determining the 
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standard of care, whether it had been breached and proximate cause. 
Over Plaintiff's objections, the Trial Court instructed the jury as 
set forth in Instructions 16 and 19. The jury found no negligence on 
the part of either defendant. 
Plaintiff appeals on the grounds that the above instructions 
are contrary to the law of this case as set forth in this Court's 
previous order of summary disposition and tended to mislead and 
confuse the jury to Plaintiff's prejudice. This constitutes 
reversible error. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 27, 1985, Plaintiff Lynn Nielsen was admitted to 
Pioneer Valley Hospital to undergo surgery on her left Knee. During 
the previous year, she had undergone substantial bridgework and 
other dental work on her teeth and on the date of admission, her 
teeth were in good condition and were intact in her mouth. (Trial 
Transcript, p.86, 87, 166, 167, 168, 173, 174, 235) 
At approximately 8:40 a.m. on that day, Plaintiff was 
interviewed by agents of Pioneer Valley Hospital and thereafter by 
Dr. Dixon, the anesthesiologist. They were informed of her dental 
work and Plaintiff's concern that the defendants take proper care to 
protect her teeth during surgery. (Trial Transcript, P. 91, 92, 93, 
149, 150, 319) 
She was thereafter admitted to surgery during which she was 
placed under general anesthesia. (Trial Transcript, P.93, 94, 238, 
239, 319, 325, 334) 
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At approximately 11:35 a.m. on February 27, 1985, while 
Plaintiff was returning to consciousness in the recovery room of 
the Hospital, Joanne Henschke, the Recovery Room nurse discovered 
that several of Plaintiff's teeth had been broken out and her 
bridgework damaged. (Trial Transcript, p. 95, 276;) 
All parties agree that the damage occurred at some time between 
the time Plaintiff entered the Defendant's care for surgery and the 
time the damage was discovered in the recovery room. (Trial 
Transcript, P.60, 65, 69, 318, 319, 505, 506, 528) 
Plaintiff was not conscious and has no direct knowledge of how 
her injury happened, nor could she negligently or intentionally 
contribute to the cause of her injury. (Trial Transcript, P. 94, 95, 
275, 276, 277) 
On October 9, 1986, Plaintiff filed this action against the 
Hospital, Dr. Dixon and Dr. Veasey, the knee surgeon. Dr. Veasey was 
subsequently dismissed from the suit. (Trial Court's Order of 
Dismissal 2/24/87, attached hereto as Exhibit A) 
The complaint alleged four causes of action against Defendants. 
The first cause of action was based upon the theory of ordinary 
negligence and malpractice against Dr. Dickson; the second was based 
on the theory of ordinary negligence and malpractice against Pioneer 
Valley Hospital, the third was based on the theory of res ipsa 
loquitur against both Dickson and the Hospital and the fourth was 
based on the theory of failure to obtain informed consent by both 
Defendants. (Plaintiff's Complaint, attached hereto as Exhibit B) 
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On February 17, 1988, Defendants moved the trial court for 
summary judgment on all causes of action based upon the fact that 
Plaintiff did not intend to provide expert testimony at trial as to 
the duty of care, its breach and causation. (Trial Court's Order of 
Summary Judgment, attached as Exhibit C.) 
On April 4, 1988. the Trial Court granted Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment, ruling in part: "that the facts of the case, 
without the benefit of expert testimony on behalf of the Plaintiff, 
did not establish the requisite elements for submission of the case 
to the jury under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." (Trial Court's 
Order of Summary Judgment, attached as Exhibit C.) 
Plaintiff thereafter appealed the summary judgment to this 
court on the issues of res ipsa loquitur and informed consent, and 
moved for summary disposition. (Plaintiff's Amended Docketing 
Statement, attached as exhibit D) 
On September 16, 1988, this Court reversed the trial court's 
summary judgment as it pertained to the theory of res ipsa loquitur, 
ruling in part: "Expert evidence is not necessary to establish the 
applicable standard of care in this case, as it appears no medical 
technicalities are involved." The case was remanded to the trial 
Court for further proceedings. (Utah Supreme Court's Order of 
Summary Disposition, attached as Exhibit E) 
At trial, Plaintiff proceeded only on the theory of res ipsa 
loquitur and did not present expert testimony on the issues of 
ordinary negligence or informed consent.(Trial Transcript, P.56, 57, 
58, 59) 
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Prior to closing argument, the trial judge instructed the jury 
as to the law. Two of the instructions proposed by Defendants and 
given to the jury were instructions numbered 16 and 19. (Trial 
Transcript, P. 475, 477) 
Plaintiff advised the judge and counsel of objections to these 
instructions prior to the time they were given to the jury, but 
Plaintiff's objections were overruled. Thereafter, Plaintiff's 
counsel was given the opportunity to put his objections on the 
record. (Trial Transcript, P. 540, 541, 542) 
The Trial Court instructed the jury by way of Instruction No. 
16 that no presumption of negligence arises from the fact of an 
adverse event occurring during the Defendant's treatment of 
Plaintiff. Instruction No. 19 instructed the jury that they were not 
permitted to use their own experience or any standard of their own 
in determining the standard of care and further instructed them that 
they must determine the proper standard of care only from medical 
expert testimony. (Instruction No. 16 attached hereto as Exhibit F; 
Instruction No. 19 attached hereto as Exhibit G) 
These instructions were given to the jury prior to closing 
argument and Plaintiff's counsel was required to attempt to explain 
to the jury in closing argument how these instructions might be 
reconciled with Plaintiff's res ipsa loquitur "common knowledge" 
theory. (Trial Transcript, P. 475, 477, 478, 479, 480) 
In closing argument, Counsel for Dr. Dixon read Instructions 
numbered 16 and 19 in their entirety to the Jury. (Trial Transcript, 
P. 526, 527, 528, 529) 
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By way of special verdict, the jury found that Plaintiff had 
failed to prove negligence on the part of either Defendant and 
never reached the issue of damages. (Amended Judgment on Verdict, 
attached as Exhibit H) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST, SECOND AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION WERE 
DISPOSED OF BY THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APRIL 
4, 1988 AND THE ONLY CAUSE REMANDED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
AND TRIED TO THE JURY WAS THE THEORY OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
A. The trial court's Order of Summary Judgment, entered on 
April 4, 1988 disposed of all of Plaintiff's causes of 
action 11 
B. Plaintiff appealed this summary judgment only on the 
issues of the res ipsa loquitur claim and the informed 
consent claim 11,12 
C. On September 16, 1988 the Utah Supreme Court summarily 
reversed the trial court's summary judgment as it 
pertained to the res ipsa loquitur theory 12 
D. Res ipsa loquitur was the only theory tried to the 
jury 12 
E. The trial court's instructions to the jury on law 
related to the theory of ordinary negligence was not 
supported by Plaintiff's theory of the case nor the 
evidence presented by Plaintiff at trial 12 
POINT II. 
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 16 AND 19 WERE IMPROPER AND RESULT 
IN REVERSIBLE ERROR BECAUSE THEY TEND TO MISLEAD THE JURY 
TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF BY IMPROPERLY STATING THE 
LAW APPLICABLE IN A RES IPSA LOQUITUR CASE BASED UPON THE 
"COMMON KNOWLEDGE" EXCEPTION TO THE RULE REQUIRING EXPERT 
TESTIMONY. 
A. Once the requisite foundation for application of the 
res ipsa loquitur theory is established, a rebuttable 
inference of negligence arises as a matter of law. . . 13 
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B. One of the foundational requirements is that the 
instrument or thing causing the injury was at the time of 
the accident under the management and control of the 
defendant 14 
C. Plaintiff established the requisite foundation at 
trial 14 
D. Therefore, a presumption of negligence was established 
from the fact that Plaintiff's injury occurred during the 
time she was in Defendant's care and control for 
treatment 14 
E. Instruction No. 16 advises the jury that "no 
presumption of negligence arises from the fact of an 
adverse event occurring during a defendant's treatment." 
It is therefore erroneous, confusing, prejudicial to 
Plaintiff and reversible error 14 
F. The Utah Supreme Court established the law of this case 
by holding that the "common knowledge" exception to the 
rule requiring expert testimony applies 14,15 
G. Instruction No. 19 prohibits the jury from using a 
standard of care derived from their own experience but 
requires them to rely only upon expert testimony in 
determining the standard. It is therefore erroneous, 
confusing, prejudicial and reversible error 15,16 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S FIRST, SECOND AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION WERE 
DISPOSED OF BY THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APRIL 4t 198 8 
AND THE ONLY CAUSE REMANDED BY THE SUPREME COURT AND TRIED TO THE 
JURY WAS THE THEORY OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
There is no question that the trial court's order of summary 
judgment granted judgment on all causes of action. (Exhibit C) As 
can be seen by Plaintiff's docketing statement on appeal from that 
order (Exhibit D) , specifically the ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, 
Plaintiff appealed only the issues of res ipsa loquitur and informed 
consent. Plaintiff did not appeal the trial court's ruling that she 
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would need expert testimony to prove the standard of care under 
Plaintiff's first and second causes of action. 
The Supreme Court's order reversing summary judgment is clearly 
limited to the issue of res ipsa loquitur. (Exhibit E) It could 
hardly be argued that this order was intended to reverse the Trial 
Court's ruling that expert testimony would be required under 
Plaintiff's first and second causes of action based upon ordinary 
negligence. As a result, Plaintiff's causes of action based upon 
ordinary negligence were disposed of by the Order of Summary 
Judgment and Plaintiff was allowed by way of the Supreme Court's 
reversal to proceed to establish negligence without expert testimony 
on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. 
In sum, the issues of ordinary negligence having been disposed 
of by way of summary judgment, the Plaintiff proceeded at trial on 
the theory of res ipsa loquitur only. (Trial transcript P. 56, 57, 
58, 59) The Court's instructions to the jury on issues of ordinary 
negligence were therefore not justified by the theory of Plaintiff's 
case nor the evidence presented by Plaintiff at trial, and, as set 
forth below, tended to confuse and mislead the jury as to the law to 
be applied to this case. 
II. INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 16 AND 19 WERE IMPROPER AND RESULT 
IN REVERSIBLE ERROR BECAUSE THEY TEND TO MISLEAD THE JURY TO THE 
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PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF BY IMPROPERLY STATING THE LAW APPLICABLE IN 
A RES IPSA LOQUITUR CASE BASED UPON THE "COMMON KNOWLEDGE" EXCEPTION 
TO THE RULE REQUIRING EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
Utah law is clear that once the foundation for res ipsa 
loquitur is established, a rebuttable inference of negligence arises 
as a matter of law (See Nixdrof v. Hicken, 612 P. 2d 348 [Ut. 
1980]; Dalley v, Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 132 Ut. Adv. 
Rep. 17, [Ut. 1990]). The foundation required is: 
(1) The accident was of a kind which in the 
ordinary course of events, would not have 
happened had the Defendant used due care, 
(2) The instrument or thing causing the injury 
was at the time of the accident under the 
management and control of the Defendant, and 
(3) The accident happened irrespective of any 
participation by the Plaintiff. (Virginia S. 
v. Salt Lake Care Center, 741 P.2d 969 (Utah 
1987) 
Once this foundation is established, a rebuttable inference of 
negligence arises from the very fact that the adverse event occurred 
during the Defendants care and treatment. 
As to the first requirement, that the injury was of a kind 
which in the ordinary course of events would not have happened had 
defendants used due care, Plaintiff presented uncontroverted 
evidence that all of her teeth were in place when she entered 
Defendant's care for a knee operation (Trial Transcript, P. 86, 87, 
166, 167, 168, 173, 174, 235), and that several were found to be 
broken out when she regained consciousness in the recovery room. 
(Trial Transcript, P. 95, 276) As to the requirement that the injury 
happened irrespective of Plaintiff's participation, she presented 
uncontroverted evidence that from the time she entered surgery until 
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the time the injury was discovered in the recovery room, Plaintiff 
was under general anesthesia and not in a position to negligently or 
intentionally knock her own teeth out.(Trial Transcript, PP 94, 95, 
275, 276, 277) Plaintiff met the third and final requirement by 
presenting uncontroverted evidence that the defendants were in 
complete control of the environment and procedures of the operation 
and recovery and were therefore responsible for all reasonably 
probable causes to which the injury could be attributed. (Trial 
Transcript, PP. 60, 65, 69, 270, 318, 319, 505, 506, 528) Having 
established this foundation, a presumption that defendant's were 
negligent was established as a matter of law. This presumption is 
established primarily upon the fact that Plaintiff's injury happened 
while she was in the control and care of Defendants. 
Yet Instruction No. 16 advises the jury that "no presumption of 
negligence arises from the fact of an adverse event occurring during 
a Defendant's treatment." Clearly this instruction is contrary to 
the law as set forth in Nixdrof, supra, in a res ipsa loquitur case 
such as the instant case. And when given in addition to the res 
ipsa loquitur instruction which advises the jury that exactly the 
opposite is true (Attached as Exhibit I) it would certainly tend to 
mislead the jury and confuse them to Plaintiff's prejudice. 
Instruction 19 serves to further compound the jury's confusion. 
As this Court indicated in its order reversing the trial court's 
summary judgment: "expert evidence is not necessary to establish the 
applicable standard of care in this case, as it appears no medical 
technicalities are involved." (Exhibit E) . In making this ruling 
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the Supreme Court referred to Nixdrof, supra, which sets out the 
common knowledge exception to the general rule that expert testimony 
is required. The Nixdrof Court stated 
•.•however, in certain situations, the medical 
procedure is so common or the outcome so 
affronts our notions of medical propriety that 
expert testimony is not required to establish 
what would occur in the ordinary course of 
events. In this type of situation the 
Plaintiff can rely on the common knowledge and 
understanding of laymen to establish this 
element (Nixdrof v. Hicken, supra at page 353 
[emphasis added]) (Also see Dalley v- Utah 
Valley Regional Medical Center, supra) 
However, the trial court's jury Instruction No. 19 instructs 
the jury exactly the opposite. Its states: "you are not permitted 
to use a standard derived from your own experience with physicians, 
nor any other standard of your own". It further goes on to state: 
"the only way you may properly learn such standard and thus 
determine whether or not the physician in this case conformed to it, 
is through evidence presented during this trial by physicians in the 
same field of practice testifying as expert witnesses who knew of 
that standard as it existed at that time.H This instruction is 
clearly contrary to the law as set forth in Nixdrof and as applied 
to this case by the Utah Supreme Court in it's order reversing the 
trial court's summary judgment. Thus, the trial court has 
erroneously advised the jury as to the law which applies to this 
case, and defendants have accomplished by jury instructions what 
they attempted to do by way of summary judgment. That is to deny 
Plaintiff a full and fair hearing of her claim. 
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In the case of Knapstad v. Smith Management Corporation, 774 P. 
2d, 1 [Utah 1989]) the Utah Court of Appeals noted as follows: 
An instruction is improper and results in reversible 
error if "it tends to mislead the jury to the 
prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently 
or erroneously advises the jury on the law" (citing 
Steele v. Brienholt, 747 P.2d 433-435) 
The Knapstad case applies directly to the instance case. For 
the fact that the instructions complained of tend to mislead and 
confuse the jury to the prejudice of Plaintiff is obvious. Plaintiff 
outlined her theory of res ipsa loquitur and the "Common knowledge" 
exception to the rule requiring expert testimony in her opening 
statement. She thereafter proceeded to present evidence in support 
of this theory and did not present expert evidence to support a 
theory of ordinary negligence. Under these circumstances, 
instructions 16 and 19 resulted in reversible error consistent with 
the guidelines set out in the Knapstad case. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, Defendants Instructions No. 16 and 19 constitute 
reversible error in that they improperly advise the jury as to the 
law applicable in a res ipsa loquitur case based upon the "common 
knowledge" exception to the rule requiring expert testimony, and 
misinformed and confused the jury to Plaintiff's prejudice. The 
16 
trial court's verdict should be reversed and Plaintiff should be 
granted a new trial as a result-
Dated this c^y^C day of /p\A*4//\/ , 1990-
ly submitted, 
DANIEL DARGER 
Attorney at Law 
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m e L I U C udi i ics div : * i : - - i r : t * *• w h e t h e r 
m d i v : * . c o r p o r a t i o n s o r o* , - : , a . . a^ - . : . : 
t M a ^ M p , , T , , . •, * •; < • - l a w n . ] a i n* i f f \ ' : ' \ \ 
P i a i u t n l therelore sues L e -, ' " ^ ' 11s 
names Wl^n nlqint-i ff hqc loariuu ,tt; : * ^ t iiu.i.t o a;,. 
capaci: i>.-'« : ' ..• ( * clef end. ait •, , *, :ie<. elai:-: ; t : wil 1 
seek leava» e 
f o r t h a m Ii t ,, .u- *-.. -. .a a p a L i i ,*. 
^ v 6 .* . : * * * i • •- %1- a l s o r e s e r v e s tin.- r i ^ a t a i d 
s u c h o t h e r p a r t i e s a s a i v e -
i n t h e a c t s a n d n r n i r r e n u " a i l e ^ e a . e . c . i i 
r "k< 1 Oi i. o r a b o \ it: D e c e m b e r * l^r ., • ; • " • • ! ! " py\ \v 
^ 4 ' l 
d e f e nd an t P i o n e e r V a 1 1 e j 1 1 c • 
this action for m a l p r a c t i c e b> u a L i it-a .naj 1 - i u; /c. :-..• -
-2-
rt. ]L . > r e .qm > 
U t a h Code Ann , 'S . •< r :? t: r > p , lJ ! 
de f i iUua .n .. • k s n n iii_; ^ , , - ^ s v no : 
t o commence r i i i i . i . t : - ; . or m a l p r a c t i c e ^ r t i f i - J • ,1 • 
i: e t * - -
Malpracti* e A : M du * - e v^ . 
ta'9. T ] ! ' • ! ! ! * is complit /. «. » statute rv 
preli tigation panel review, Utah Code Ann, , ~ * ~ et seq., 
a s e v I den c e d b y t h e ,A f f i d a v i t < :> f I) a v i d E R o b i i i s o n,, I) i r ector, 
1 11: a 1 i I ) ::f i ; ::i: s i • : i: 1 : f 0 • =:: <::: i I p a 1: j o i i a ] <!:! I m : =» f e s s i • ::» i: i a 1 I i • : e i i s ::i i I g , 
a 11 a c h e d h e r e t o a s E x h i b i t: "'"  \ "' 
FIRST CAUSE r ACTION 
KW- -h ? 7 . ^ ° ° ; ~ - l a i r . f i ** > s 
admit*oa '.'Mu^jir !i n^-r ;.U;ey Hrspitai tor r; crosurgery 
I ,<rf,prv uv p, r*.x,.,T,p,. ' ^ f e n i ir,L 
de f er..;ant 1' . < . 
•
 (1 1 ] P r i o i: t o 11 i e a d in i n i s t: r a t Ei o n o f a n e s t h e s I a t o 
I >.l i i i 11 • i f f i 1 : : • J ' : J : ii i c i "ii : "i 
under defenda*.: . : . i ^  .; ^ v»n: , *l r.t r sennit iv:' ^ 
anesthesia anu ui i * • *\ one i ' ; ^vp--^ - -eta and 
extensi ve bridpewoi - recent . -_-eT. 1. 
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Plaint H I be 
n e e d *-n vr^v:^^ i p e t i a i p , o t e c i j i , . *. i i t « » . . - . ' d e n t a l wcnv 
when b e i n g p l a *ed u a d c : r - i i r i a aiw::t* e > i a 
O? 12. 
f o r s u r g e : -u ; ; : I I I R ; :<t- <oar:* j - urge: immediately 
thereafter a--* * - t *• • •• : '** • r * u n d e r 
gei l e i a ] < . > : e • damaged 
'.iO ' b r i d g e w o i i •- ^y* •* . - damaged. 
S a i d damage was a d ^ ^ ^ ! -v-Ti i t - : • u o l 
i; e s s n e s - ^ i e r e n d a n : , . ^ s t 
d e f e n d a n t ; : r\* *<-i\ f 1: I e<i • - x e r « : i s e t h e d e g r e e of -***.. and 
c a r e ^ r i i a n a ^ : -: i :< ' in s i m i . < •-" » 
p h y s i ai:s a*.a - . ^ ^ a t ; . . a g i s t s e n g a g e d - ," «>t 
p r a c t i . ,- i i : rai • : a'<** ' :* , t . : : m; l a r K)ca t I.1 -
n e u . i i ^ n c e 01 ;<• * *. :m.i*r , i A a i , ; : ^i : JI .,eu a i d u r e g r e a t 
p a i n • : : : T i r . i , u i scomi o: • , la )iv. " i n e i i r e aiv "i i i a t io : . 
m a t i 
and c ; 
,3> 
v v e " . . - * \ * ~ • / 1 , i 
r i:::.''* aired a.d .a jxnnat e re>> a : \ ;e 
nep 1 -
performed. 
S E C 0 N D CAUSE OF AC riON 
1* P a r a g r a p hs 1 1 5 he re i n a bove are r e a11e g e d 
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. •. . ^... i g e r y , t h ° ^ O M :• *. - >^e > • * -J-- ' M i * * -
: > ] L I ; ; ' : : ; . i f t t • : : , i v . d e f ^ . i a n t _ } - - . < •* n*<1 V- • * : 
a s s i s t s • • < :: - • \ 
n i r r e n t ,
 ; . u i i . ^ ,^ . ,u* \-. - <- ^n\\ . •.-* i ' defendant: h o n e t - r 
T a ; l < .:< s p i t a .. \ ,1 : . i *^- - t_ f r .- .;e u i t h e i r a u l i e s a s 
A , ^ . * P r i o r : „ ? ht- a d m i n i s t r a t i s , -f M y e s t h e s i a 
i l a m * *4 -' a i n t i f f -n:-^ *ne«' s a i d e m p l o y e e s of d e f e - ' 
, • . \ . . . ne , . .i i: ° f a c t 
i h a t >:.•• -..: : c a p p e d t o r t h and e M e t s i v e b r i d g e w o r k w h i c h had 
r e c e i r ' • . . • n s l a l l e i u n a . ; 
awarp r ; ie n e e d , . % ,|»ei i . i . p ;t<j^.r i o n 
*o: • . * * : d e n t a l work when " e i r . g p l a c e d u::de_ g e n e r a l 
a n e s t : : - : : La . 
v At <snmA fimo dnri.^p- ^ o preparation of plaintiff 
fo: surge:"/' r :.i.n«; * r^ .;• .so o: s-:-i -mrgerv ^ - T '^dia'cely 
'hereafter, .ma Uarnig su 
• - i i " i ,-.es; iesia. sever- : , a. :t : : : s : t-t-i n v«.o:>- :amaged 
.md broker: !iv;i '•• : bridg^wirk was severely damaged 
20. Said damage was a 
= ' . . .j/.-;ice and carelessness * . -*i i*^ una .;iier personnel 
cinpiovi:.: !v defendant Pioneer Vallr^ and ailing WILL-.;. Lne 
scope oi Lueir emp 1 oyineni 
-3-
21. As a * 
negligence of sai d * .*-r . < * • u-*<-iu:<ud iiuh^^i Valley, 
p 1 a i n t i f f w a s f o r c e d t o e n d u r e g r e a t: p a i i i, s u f f e ring, 
:i i s c o in f o i I:, , i i i • :: o i in '" e i 1 i e i i c e a i i ::i I: i \ i in i 1; i a 1: :i • : i I i i I 11 i a t: 
wer e brokei i :u - M* J I J .ive 1:1: iem recapped ai id other 
extensive dei.t.
 : . u< • > p e r f o r m e d 
• 2 2 . - .J | J • . inn! < .
 r ,,. I I I ' ,!,„ 
negligence of s a i d e in p 1 o y e e s o f defendant •:: .. i. - - • ? Valley, 
plai ntii ff has i ncurr -•' ' ^ ^ trmtial expenses related to the 
i ELi 11: a ] : ; :  i 1 :  s 1: ie 1: ias ye perf ormed . 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
23. nragraph ] -.- \° •: ***_-inabove are realise*' 
. v ' 
-/f d e i ' M i d ^ n * * •- •. ^ . . • c k s >n u ; F^ MV_* -: \ a l l ^ \ d u r i n g \ h e 
p e r i u u jLiiiiiiedia* • ". < p i i o r t o , a u r i : 
p e r f o r m a n c e r,: , i , e ^ i m n n h e r rs ' J . : \. . 7 , . ' ^' 
A \ s 2 5 . P l . i i a t i f i !.^ v . r N- i: : • d v b : . t- s h e w a s u n d e r 
t h e e : •! - * * «*• m a co i 
"V^26. :• . . 1 ^ n t - ? ^ .- : t u j a . . . i-• .. .* -><=• e x p e r t s i n t h e 
j : \ 3 v i :. )i a t r . i i ^ i l ^,\ro ,\. j - ^ . ' u t e w t r - , * 
p * * r f o : - ^ i - . : - a n a t h e aar.» 
- * : ' . i _ d , . p n n t-hpni ^ \ p e *LL>. 
i 7 Tl le iii lines suffered l-v plaintiff could not have 
occurieu m the absent- *•> ! 
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28. Therefore, under the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur defendants are liable to plaintiff for the injuries 
as alleged herein. 
29. As a direct and proximate result of the 
negligence of defendants, plaintiff was forced to endure great 
pain, suffering, discomfort, inconvenience and humiliation in 
that her teeth were broken and she had to have them recapped 
and other extensive dental work performed. 
30. As a further direct: and proximat:e resu ] t o £ 11: le 
negligence of defendants, plaintiff has incurred substantial 
expenses related to the dental work she has had to have 
performed. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
31. Paragraphs 1 through 30 hereinabove are realleged. 
32. Defendants Veasy, Dickson and Pioneer Valley were 
further negligent in that they failed to inform plaintiff that 
an injury of the type she incurred could or might occur in 
connection with her knee surgery. 
33. As a result of defendants' failure to warn 
plaintiff, she was forced to endure great pain, suffering, 
discomfort, inconvenience and humiliation in that her teeth 
were broken and she had to have them recapped and had to have 
extensive additional dental work performed. 
34. As a further direct and proximate result of 
defendants1 failure to warn, plaintiff has incurred substantial 
-7-
expenses related to the dental work she has had to have 
performed. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays f c.. .,hv *-r favor 
and against the defendants for such damages as are alleged 
herein, and for such other relief as the Court shall deem 
reasonable and proper. 
Dated this °l day of October, 1986. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
By SJ!H[A.6/~ Z^tu^U^Cu^ 
Jojm W. Andrews 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Plaintiff's Address: 
2520 Horseshoe Circle 
South Jordan, Utah 84065 
9209M 
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160 East 300 South,"'(^ Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801? 530-6730 
EXHIBIT "A" 
BEFORE 7 HI, 1H VIRION UPATIOMAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE-OF UTAH 
LINN NIELSEN 
-vs-
Petitioner 
Case Mo PR- 86-023 
A F F Z D A V I T 
D- M. DICKSON.. M.D., GEORGE VEAllY» h, I) , 
and" PIONEER VALLEY HOSPITAL 
Respondent*,;;) 
I, David E. Robinson, Director, Division of Occupational & Professional 
Licensing, Department of Business Regulation, hereby certify that the 
petitioner has complied with the filing requirements as set forth in 
Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann*, 1953 as amended. However, due to the 
backlog of existing cases, a hearing was not held within the 90-days a 
panel retains jurisdiction. Additionally, a stipulation extending 
jurisdiction was not extended by all parties. 
The initiation of any further proceedings in district court, is left for 
subsequent action by the parties involved. 
Dated this 15th 
1986 . 
_»1 a y o t September 
David E 
Directo 
A 7 E S E A I 
^4ltLako County Uiah 
DAVID W. SLAGLE 
No. A2975 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Pioneer Valley Hospital 
Eleventh Floor, Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, ORDER AND SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
vs. 
PIONEER VALLEY HOSPITAL, No, C-86-7731 
D. M. DICKSON, GEORGE D. Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
VEASY and DOES I THROUGH 
V, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
The Motions of defendants, Pioneer Valley Hospital, and 
D. M. Dickson, M.D., came on regularly for hearing before 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on Friday, March 18, 1988. 
The plaintiff was represented by Daniel Darger, the defendant 
Pioneer Valley Hospital was represented by David W. Slagle, 
and the defendant D. M. Dickson, M.D., was represented by 
Gary D. Stott. The Court heard argument of counsel, considered 
APR 4 19^0 
Deputy Clerk 
the files and records of the Court herein, reviewed the Memo-
randa of the parties, and considered the Affidavit of 
Dr. Lawrence E. Reichmann. Having taken into consideration 
all of the above, the Court found: 
1. That the evidence before the Court at the time of the 
hearing did not establish a prima facie case of negligence 
or causation against either of the defendants; and 
2. That the facts of the case, without the benefit of 
expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff, did not 
establish the requisite elements for submission of the case 
to the jury under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that Judgment be entered in favor of the defendants, Pioneer 
Valley Hospital and Dr. D. M. Dickson, and against the 
plaintiff, no cause of action, with costs awarded to the 
defendants. 
DATED this \ day of <^^k^^^ , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
-2-
iSXHIi* LT 1 ) 
DANIEL DARGER (0815) 
Attorney for Appellant 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF T1IK 
LYNN NIELSEN, : 
Appellant, : AMENDED DOCKETING 
STATEMENT 
: (Subject to Assignment 
vs. to the Court of Appeals) 
• 
PIONEER VALLEY HOSPITAL, 
D.M. DICKSON, and DOES : Case Nu MRU Nil 
I THROUGH V, inclusive, 
Respondents. 
Appellant, Lynn Nielsen, pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court hereby submits the following docketing 
statement. 
I. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court hat. pn I mi i <• i u>n ovir Hit; .ippeal pursuant to 
§78-2-2(3) (i) , Utah Code Annotated (1988). 
II. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a final order of summary judgment 
entered against the Appellant on the 4th day of April, I'JHti, by 
the Third District Court, the Honorable Homei \< Wilkinson 
presiding. Notice of Appeal was filed on the 28th day of Apri1, 
1988. 
FACTS 
On February 27, 1985, Appellant Lynn Nielsen entered 
Respondent Pioneer Valley Hospital to undergo surgery on her left 
knee. During the previous year, she had undergone I nit ii! 
bridgework and other dental work on her teeth. 
A1 appi <t>x i nil11 e 1 v 1* ' 4 »>n V<iibi -. .• JQD , Appe 11 ant 
was interviewed by agents f Respondent Pioneer Valley Hospital 
as well as Respondent Dickson, the anesthesiologist They were 
informed of I HEM: • dent all wor k She was tl itei: ea fter ad mi tted to 
surgery during which she was placed under general anesthesia. 
All parties agree that when Appellant went into surgery for her 
knee, her dental work was In place and in good condition. 
At approximately 11:35 a n on February 27, 1985, while 
App«*l I «mt Willi lit1!!!'! cioiiiifi i ouii in Hie i KM* vet v room of Respondent 
Pioneer Valley Hospital and under the exclusive care and control 
of the Respondents, a nurse discovered that Appellant's teeth 
woio broken a mull damaged All |ait lus aijitM1 I ha I i* was somei im<< 
between the time Appellant entered the Respondent's care for 
surgery and the time she left the recovery room that her dental 
work "wain broken ami daiiayieii i\ ppel 1 ai it 'was not co rn.it . . - '• > a 
no direct knowledge of how hor injury happened. 
0 n or a b o u t October 9, f Appellant filed a complaint 
against Respondents Pioneer i t ? H- 3 
others, alleging that her teeth and bridgework had been damaged 
2 
< 3ue to their negligence
 r either before, during or after «-^ r 
operation on nt? knee. As one of her causes of action, Appellant 
alleged that thi-* respondents shoul d be deemed pr ehuimpf i v»-1 v 
negligent under the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur. 
• O n F H b i n a r y 1IJ VH17 the District Court entered ai i order 
dismissing George : Veasy as a Defendant, thus leaving only 
Respondents Dickson Pioneer Valley Hospital as Defendants in 
till: le case { See Ex:: Attached I: lei:: eto J 
On or about February 17, 1988, Respondent Dickson filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment which was thereafter joined by 
Responde i 11 I • I oi i e e r Va 1 1 e y I lo s p :i ta 1 The g r < >\ x n d s C > J I he uio t: I o n 
were that Plaintiff could not prove negligence at trial as a 
matter of law because she did i: lot plan to present medical exper t 
testimony to support her claim that Respondents PI oi leei: /a] 1 ey 
Hospital and Dr. Dickson breached their duty of reasonable care 
Ji i t tiiuMi 1 lealmenl <>l Appel I .in I . R e s p o n d e n t s argued the general 
rule iiri most, medical malpractice cases, that, expert testimony is 
required because the technical nature of the issues remove the 
p a r t ictilijii it it'Mi nil i ( ,ii pi a c t i r n a n d \ h v r e q u i s i t e s t a n d a r d rif 
care from the knowledge and understanding of an average citizen. 
Appellant responded by arguing that the i nstant case fa 1 1 s 
wi! hin the f'xref it inn I the general Mile requiring expei t 
testimony because the propriety of the treatment received by 
Appellant Is within the knowledge and experience oi \h** layman. 
11 Is Appe 11 ant:' s posi tion that 'fn- t , • ^r inir * was so 
obviously the result of negligence that negligence should be 
3 
inferred as a matter of law. Appellant further argued that the 
testimony of her treating dentist to the effect that Appellant's 
teeth were in good shape and of such nature that it would take a 
significant blow or unusual impact to damage them, was competent, 
expert testimony to prove the issue of negligence. 
These issues were argued before Judge Wilkinson, who ruled 
that Appellant needed to provide expert testimony to prove that 
the damage to Appellants teeth while under the exclusive care 
and control of the Respondents was the result of negligence. 
(See Exhibit A Attached hereto) 
Judge Wilkinson's order and summary judgment constituted a 
final judgment of all claims of all parties hereto. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1) Do the issues to be determined in establishing the 
standard of care and breach thereof in this case involve medical 
technicalities requiring expert testimony or are they within the 
common knowledge and experience of layman so that negligence may 
be inferred as a matter of law pursuant to the Doctrine of Res 
Ipsa Loquitur. 
2) If expert testimony is required to establish 
negligence, does the testimony of Plaintiff's treating dentist 
qualify as such expert testimony to establish that negligence was 
most likely the cause of Appellant's injury. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES 
Appellant dose not rely upon statutes in this case. The 
following cases are relied upon in support of this appeal. 
4 
a. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 264, 348, 351 (Utah 1980); 
b. Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270 
(Utah App. 1987) 
c. Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 
262, 264 (Utah App. 1987} 
d. Fredrickson v. Maw. 277 P.2d 772 (Utah 1951) 
e. Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care Center 741 P.2d 969 (Utah 
1987) 
PRIOR APPEALS 
There have been no prior appeals in this matter. 
ATTACHMENTS 
To clarify the record, attached hereto are the following: 
a. The Third District Court's order and Summary Judgment 
from which Appellant appeals herein; 
b. The Notice of Appeal filed herein; 
c Order of Dismissal (George D. Veasy). 
Dated this ^f) ' day of HA^CC 1988. 
DANIEL DARGER 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Amended Docketing Statement (Subject to Assignment to 
the Court of Appeals) was mailed, thisQ£L*^_ &ay °* June, 1988, 
to: 
Gary D. Stott 
Michael A. Peterson 
Richards, Brandt, Miller 
& Nelson 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
and 
David W. Slagle 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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EXHIBIT A 
v.. 
DAVID W. SLAGLE 
No. A2975 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Pioneer Valley Hospital 
Eleventh Floor, Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: 521-9000 
i * oaltUk* County Utah 
APR 4 1980 
Deputy Ctefk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PIONEER VALLEY HOSPITAL, 
D. M. DICKSON, GEORGE D. 
VEASY and DOES I THROUGH 
V, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
No. C-86-7731 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The Motions of defendants, Pioneer Valley Hospital, and 
D. M. Dickson, M.D., came on regularly for hearing before 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on Friday, March 18, 1988. 
The plaintiff was represented by Daniel Darger, the defendant 
Pioneer Valley Hospital was represented by David w. Slagle, 
and the defendant D. M. Dickson, M.D., was represented by 
Gary D. Stott. The Court heard argument of counsel, considered 
the files and records of the Court herein, reviewed the Memo-
randa of the parties, and considered the Affidavit of 
Dr. Lawrence E. Reichmann. Having taken into consideration 
all of the above, the Court found: 
1. That the evidence before the Court at the time of the 
hearing did not establish a prima facie case of negligence 
or causation against either of the defendants; and 
2. That the facts of the case, without the benefit of 
expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff, did not 
establish the requisite elements for submission of the case 
to the jury under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that Judgment be entered in favor of the defendants, Pioneer 
Valley Hospital and Dr. D. M. Dickson, and against the 
plaintiff, no cause of action, with costs awarded to the 
defendants. 
DATED this l day of <^Z<^^^ , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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EXHIBIT E 
RECEIVED SZ? 2 0 1383 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
September 16, 1988 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Daniel Darger, Esq. 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lynn Nielsen, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. No. 880170 
Pioneer Valley Hospital, 
D.M. Dickson, George D. Veasy 
and Does I Through V, inclusive, 
Defendants and Appellee. 
Appellant's motion for summary disposition of this matter 
is hereby granted. The trial court was manifestly in error in 
granting summary judgment since material facts are in dispute. 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980) is controlling 
on the issue of res ipsa loquitur. Expert evidence is not 
necessary to establish the applicable standard of care in this 
case, as it appears no medical technicalities are involved. 
The summary judgment is reversed and this case is remanded 
for further proceedings. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
EXHIBIT F 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A physician is not a guarantor of successful 
results, and therefore, no presumption of negligence arises 
from the fact of an adverse event occurring during a 
defendant's treatment. The measure of duty owed by the 
defendant physician to the patient is that degree of care, 
skill and diligence ordinarily possessed and exercised, 
under similar circumstances, by other physicians in the 
same practice and profession. The physician must use 
ordinary and reasonable care and diligence in providing 
medical care to the patient. If you find from the evidence 
in this case that the doctor provided care in compliance 
with the standard as defined in these instructions then you 
must find for the defendant physician. 
If complications or adverse results occur in 
connection with a doctor's treatment of a patient, such 
facts, in and of themselves, do not prove that the doctor 
was negligent. 
EXHIBIT G 
INSTRUCTION NO. L_^J 
In determining whether the physician properly 
fulfilled his duty imposed upon him as a physician, in his 
treatment and care of plaintiff, you are not permitted to 
use a standard derived from your own experience with 
physicians, nor any other standard of your own. 
The standard of professional care by which the 
physician is to be judged by you is that degree of 
learning, care and skill ordinarily possessed and used by 
other physicians undertaking the care of a patient under 
similar circumstances in the same field of practice at the 
time such treatment and care was rendered. 
The only way you may properly learn such 
standard and thus determine whether or not the physician 
in this case conformed to it, is through evidence 
presented during this trial by physicians in the same 
field of practice testifying as expert witnesses who knew 
of that standard as it existed at that time. 
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EXHIBIT H 
RECEIVED :UK 0 5 g t f 
GARY D. STOTT (A3130) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant D. M. Dickson, M.D. 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (80H 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN NIELSEN, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PIONEER VALLEY HOSPITAL, ] 
D. M. DICKSON, GEORGE D. VEASY ] 
and DOES I through V 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 
1 AMENDED 
I JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
i Civil No. C86-7731 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinso 
The Court, upon receiving a unanimous verdict from 
the jury of no cause of action in favor of the defendants and 
against the plaintiff, does hereby enter judgment on the 
verdict dismissing the above-entitled action with prejudice, 
costs being awarded to the defendant, Pioneer Valley Hospital, 
in the amount of $ ~~ 0~~ , and costs being awarded to 
the defendant, D. M. Dickson, M.D,, in the amount of 
, together with interest as^ ,al2X)wed by law. 
DATED this day of ///«Hf 1, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ 74tnrWL ; P r ^ ^ ^ 
HON. JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid 
this /ZO day of April, 1989, to the following counsel of 
record: ! 
Daniel Darger, Esq, 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
David W. Slagle, Esq, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Defendant Pioneer Valley Hospital 
• fifkc 
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EXHIBIT I 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
The Court instructs you that in certain situations 
it is not necessary for the plaintiff in a medical 
malpractice action to present evidence of the defendants^ 
negligence by expert testimony. Specifically# where the 
propriety of the treatment received is within the common 
knowledge and experience of the layman, expert testimony 
is unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed to 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff must, however, establish 
by the evidence that: 
1. The accident was of a kind which, in the 
ordinary course of events, would not have happened had 
the defendant (s) used due care; 
2. The instrument or thing causing the injury 
was at the time of the accident under the management and 
control of the defendant(s); and 
3. The accident happened irrespective of any 
participation at the time by the plaintiff. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
all three of the above criteria have been met/ then you 
may find an inference of negligence from those circumstances. 
This does not mean that negligence is necessarily established, 
it merely creates an inference which may be rebutted by the 
defendant or defendants. 
